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FEE SHIFTING AND PREDICTABILITY OF LAW
KEITH N. HYLTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers are trained to distinguish between substance and proce-
dure. The substantive law is comprised of standards, such as the
Learned Hand formula of negligence, that are used to determine
whether a violation of the law has occurred. Procedural rules, on the
other hand, determine whether and under what conditions a party can
bring suit or be joined in an ongoing suit, the conditions under which a
decision may be appealed, the burden of proof, and the allocation of
legal expenses.1
Virtually no part of legal training involves the study of the influ-
ence of procedure on substantive law. This is odd, and even astonish-
ing, because it should be obvious that procedural rules have an
enormous influence on the development of legal doctrine. Would
anyone believe that the substance of the law would not be affected by
a procedural rule that had the effect of barring access to the courts to
virtually all claims? Consider, for example, a rule requiring tort plain-
tiffs to pay ten times the legal expenses of the defendant. Would any-
one think such a rule had no implications for the future development
of tort doctrine?
Not only are procedural rules important because they set the
terms on which parties may take advantage of the legal entitlements
granted by substantive rules, but also procedural rules have effects on
the margin. One can think of procedural rules as gates that determine
the flow of claims into courts, which are constantly reshaping legal
doctrine; open the gate a little wider, and the emerging doctrine takes
a different shape.
* I thank Andy Chen, Richard Craswell, Tony D'Amato, John Donohue, Mark Grady,
David Haddock, Gary Lawson, Peter Seigelman, and Janet Spragens for helpful suggestions.
1. This list is not intended to be exhaustive. It should include the rules governing summary
disposition of claims, the discovery process, class actions, and the jurisdiction of courts and prob-
ably should include rules governing the admissibility of evidence.
There is the further difficulty that the distinction between substance and procedure is hard
to maintain in some areas of litigation. Consider, for example, contract law. If one assumes that
courts generally attempt to enforce agreements, then it seems to follow that much of contract
law, if not all, should be labeled "procedural." Indeed, one could make a plausible argument
that the expression "contract law" is an oxymoron. I do not deal with this problem below.
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The point of this Article is to examine the marginal influence of a
certain set of procedural rules on the substance of law. Substance,
however, can mean many things. To narrow the scope, I will focus on
predictability of law.2 I will also discuss general, speculative implica-
tions for the substance of law. Because the term procedure can also
cover an almost infinite variety of rules, I will focus on a subset: litiga-
tion cost allocation rules. I will consider the American rule, under
which each party pays its own legal expenses, the British rule, under
which the losing party pays the legal expenses of the winner, and the
Pro-plaintiff rule, under which the defendant pays the legal expenses
of the prevailing plaintiff. The American rule has been referred to as
"no-way" fee shifting, the British as "two-way" shifting, and the Pro-
plaintiff as "one-way" shifting.
This Article arrives at two conclusions. First, I reject J. Robert S.
Prichard's claim that the British rule is superior to the American in its
influence on predictability.3 Second, I argue that the best rule on pre-
dictability grounds is the Pro-plaintiff.4
The claim that the British rule enhances predictability is more
than a simple statement about the economics of the litigation process.
For it provides a rigorous-indeed, mathematical-foundation for the
2. Alternatively, this Article focuses on uncertainty in law. Since the subject of legal un-
certainty is quite broad, I will not attempt to cite all of the relevant works in this area. I have
been strongly influenced by the treatment in the following: SHELDON AMOS, THE SCIENCE OF
LAW (1877); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881); BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM
AND THE LAW (1961). For more recent work in this area, see Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncer-
tainty, 71 CAL- L. REV. 1 (1983); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976). There is a recent positivist
branch of this literature, analyzing the influence of legal error on incentives to comply with the
law and to litigate. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under Negli-
gence, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 433 (1990); Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication:
An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994).
3. J. Robert S. Prichard, A Systematic Approach to Comparative Law: The Effect of Cost,
Fee, and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 451
(1988).
4. One-way fee shifting in favor of the plaintiff has been defended in other papers, though
on different grounds. This is the first article to argue that the Pro-plaintiff rule minimizes uncer-
tainty in the law.
Previous defenses of the Pro-plaintiff rule have either focused on incentive effects or "jus-
tice" arguments. Perhaps the most impressive presentation of the case on incentive grounds
appears in John Leubsdorf, Recovering Attorney Fees as Damages, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 439
(1986). In an earlier article, I demonstrated that the Pro-plaintiff rule is superior to other rules
in enhancing incentives to comply with the law and encouraging settlement. See Keith N. Hyl-
ton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1069 (1993) [herein-
after Hylton, Fee Shifting].
Justice arguments in favor of Pro-plaintiff fee shifting are presented in Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792 (1966);
Phillip J. Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IOWA L. REV.
26, 28-30 (1969).
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broader thesis, advanced by Atiyah and Summers, 5 that British law is
more formal and American law more substantive. While this thesis
may be true, its relation to the predictability argument is not as
straightforward as Prichard's article suggests.
Since the treatment below is fairly technical in places, it may help
to provide a summary here. Prichard argued that the British rule en-
hances predictability because of certain "selection effects" that both
encourage claims firmly grounded in law and discourage claims
weakly grounded in law. I demonstrate that the selection effects re-
lied on by Prichard are considerably more complicated and that it is
unclear whether greater predictability is a byproduct of the British
rule. The second part of my thesis questions the premises of the pre-
dictability-formality linkage implicit in the work of Prichard and that
of Atiyah and Summers. These analyses ignore an important type of
predictability, which I call "dynamic." When one takes this into ac-
count, the case for the Pro-plaintiff rule seems strong.
This Article is set out as follows. Section II.A defines the concept
of predictability relied on in this Article. Section II.B presents an
overview of the literature on the influence of litigation on legal uncer-
tainty. Part III presents an analysis of the influence of various litiga-
tion cost-allocation rules on the predictability of law. Part IV presents
the normative case for the Pro-plaintiff rule.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Predictability of Law
I use the terms predictability and certainty interchangeably, but
the sense in which I use these terms needs to be defined. Two types of
predictability (or, alternatively, sources of uncertainty) can be identi-
fied. One is static, which refers to the ease with which the meaning of
a legal rule can be comprehended. Statutory interpretation is con-
cerned with resolving this type of uncertainty, but it is only one of
several areas in which the static predictability problem arises. The
classic example of the interpretation problem is Blackstone's descrip-
tion of a statute that forbad a layman to "lay hands" on a priest.6 The
5. P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL INSTITU-
TIONS (1987). One can think of Prichard's argument as an application of Occam's razor to that
of Atiyah and Summers. While Atiyah and Summers rely on a large list of possible explanations
for the differences between American and British law, Prichard is able to show that they can
almost all be explained by the incentives created by financing and fee-shifting rules.
6. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 59-60 (1895).
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courts had held that the statute applied to an individual who hurt a
priest with a weapon, even though a literal construction would not
support this result. Blackstone defended this interpretation as consis-
tent with the popular use of the term "lay hands," which he under-
stood to mean "harm."'7 Bentham later seized on the example as an
illustration of the uselessness of Blackstone's approach to statutory
construction. As part of a general argument that the only useful ap-
proach to interpretation is one that aims to understand the end of the
statute, 8 Bentham asserted that the purpose of the statute was to pre-
vent local justice authorities from apprehending priests; otherwise, it
would have made little sense to restrict its application to laymen. 9
The Blackstone-Bentham dispute continues today with little pro-
gress. The example is useful here as an illustration of the number of
plausible interpretations of a relatively simple statute. In this exam-
ple, there are at least three: (1) a layman cannot put his hands on a
priest; (2) a layman cannot hurt a priest; and (3) a layman cannot
arrest a priest. The different interpretations implicit in the dispute are
not only plausible, but each is supported by an independent theory of
interpretation. 10
Again, statutory interpretation is only one example of the static
predictability problem. A slight variation of the problem arises with
common-law adjudication, where rules are announced that must then
be interpreted in later court decisions. The other large category of
static predictability problems, which for convenience I will label "rule
identification," involves determining the laws that apply to a given
7. Id. at 59.
8. Modem commentators attribute this theory to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M
SACKS, TIE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
(Tentative ed. 1958); see, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TION 25-26 (1994).
9. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES: A CRITICISM OF WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 15-18 (Charles W. Everett ed., 1928)
(a sustained, and at times savage attack on Blackstone's work).
10. The first, a layman cannot put his hands on a priest, is supported by a literal approach. It
may seem an obtuse way to interpret statutes, but there is a sensible argument, and it runs as
follows. Courts do not have the time to figure out what legislators were thinking about when
they wrote the law in a certain way. The best way to give them an incentive to be clear is to read
the statutes literally. Then legislators will be on notice that a statute that seems silly if applied
literally will be applied in a silly manner. Although modem textualists have a number of reasons
for promoting a more-or-less literal approach to interpretation, the notion of using literalism or
textualism as a method of controlling legislators is one of them. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59,66 (1988). The
argument for the second interpretation is provided in Blackstone and is intuitive. The third
interpretation results from Bentham's view that one should start with attempting to determine
the aim or the primary end of the statute. For a recent critical view of both sides of the Black-
stone-Bentham dispute, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 8.
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transaction or injury. A common method of examining law students is
to present them with problems of this sort. They are given a transac-
tion and asked to state the laws that apply or given an injury and
asked to determine the laws violated. Much of the everyday work of
lawyers involves listening to the stories of would-be plaintiffs, deter-
mining whether laws apply, and converting the stories into claims with
standing in court. This is the reverse of statutory construction, which
involves starting with a statute and determining the instances in which
it applies; rule identification involves starting with an injury or trans-
action and determining the laws that apply.
The second type of predictability is dynamic.1 I refer to the de-
gree to which parties who understand the meaning of a rule today can
be sure that meaning will remain valid tomorrow. There may be no
static uncertainty, but if the law is likely to be changed in the near
future, to a form that is unpredictable, then the current rule cannot be
relied upon in the formation of long-term contracts and plans. Simi-
larly, if conditions change in a way that gives the law, as it is framed
today, a different meaning tomorrow, then it is unreliable as a basis
for plans.
This definition of dynamic predictability must be distinguished
from the notion of stare decisis, and particularly that of an absolute
rule of stare decisis. The two concepts are not necessarily the same.
Stare decisis is a sensible policy because there must be some perma-
nence or stability in legal interpretations. Otherwise, one creates in-
centives for parties to challenge every interpretation, and the result is
the complete absence of law. An absolute rule of stare decisis may
seem desirable as a way of providing for finality in the interpretation
of a rule, and it may seem to be the surest way of establishing rules
that can be relied upon in making plans. An absolute rule of stare
decisis may not be consistent, however, with the goal of enhancing
dynamic predictability.' 2 A law that has been rendered obsolete or
useless as the result of a change in conditions may not be a solid basis
on which to plan. Knowing that the rule serves no useful purpose,
parties that are subject to it may ignore it, under the assumption that
only an unreasonable person would attempt to force them to comply
11. The distinction between static and dynamic uncertainty, though expressed in different
terms, is emphasized in LEONI, supra note 2, at 77-96.
12. One could say this is the theme of Calabresi's recent study of common-law evolution.
See GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). Because of legisla-
tive inertia, statutes tend to stay on the books long after they become obsolete. In response to
this problem, Calabresi argues that courts should openly review and modify statutes that have
become obsolete.
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with an obsolete or useless law. 13 And, if the rule is truly useless,
parties who were never aware of it are unlikely to learn of its exist-
ence, except through the employment of attorneys. The existence of a
significant number of useless, though stable, rules could very well be a
worrisome source of legal risk, or "man-traps" in Bentham's words. 14
There is some tension between the notions of static and dynamic
predictability. On the most general level, the tension is implied by the
definitions. An effort to eliminate all sources of static uncertainty in a
law would require the legislature to indicate precisely the boundary of
the statute, which would require a number of precise descriptions of
instances in which the statute applies. Unless stated otherwise, the
implication would be that the omitted instances are those in which the
statute did not apply, but such an approach is likely to reduce the
degree to which the statute's application is predictable in the dynamic
sense. It is unlikely that a legislature would foresee all of the in-
stances in which the statute should apply. Disputes will arise later that
seem obvious instances in which the statute should apply, but the leg-
islature failed to foresee them. In addition, tastes and technology will
change in unforeseeable ways over time, presenting new scenarios
that seem to require application of the statute.
13. For example, a rule regulating the use of horse-drawn carriages might have served a
good purpose ninety years ago, but be of little use today. If the rule remains on the books,
however, it may provide credibility to an otherwise frivolous lawsuit or it may give discretion to
justice authorities to prosecute certain individuals who unknowingly violate the statute.
As a second example, consider the Connecticut statute banning contraceptive devices struck
down by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). Calabresi
notes that by the time of the Court's decision the statute had become a legislative anachronism,
inconsistent with practice, common law, and other statutes in Connecticut. See CALABRESI,
supra note 12, at 8. Suppose the rule were still valid law. How would it affect behavior? Would
adherence to stare decisis enhance the certainty of law in Connecticut governing the use of
contraceptives? I believe that the law would sit like an undiscovered land mine in a farmer's
field, or for some litigants it would be the equivalent of the occasional piano falling out of a
window. Given its practical obsolescence, only a handful of Connecticut lawyers would probably
have some inkling of the existence of the statute, and discovery of the rule would be nothing less
than the surprise of a lifetime to the defendant prosecuted for violating it.
14. BENTHAM, supra note 9, at 164. Bentham regarded the law governing the interpretation
of deeds as a large source of unintuitive, bizarre, and in some cases useless rules that were
nevertheless fairly stable. Id. at 163-64. Their contribution to predictability is summarized by
Bentham as follows:
I speak of those... [rules] ... according to which a disposition in itself acknowledged
to be legal is not to be carried into effect for want of certain legal words: words which
were it not for that express appointment, which men are never told of, and which a man
must be a sorcerer to divine, would appear to carry quite another meaning than what is
given them. Yes, I must again repeat it, which men are never told of: for it is not to call
it, telling men in general, the burying here and there by accident a few obscure notices
in a lay-stall of legal gibberish, which no man rakes into that is not paid. When the
danger spreads itself the kingdom over, I will not call it warning for a chance lawyer to
get up in Westminster Hall and whisper to his fellows 'there are man-traps here'.
[Vol. 71:427
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Tax and securities laws present some of the famous examples of
the tension between dynamic and static forms of legal uncertainty,
though the tension is general and not at all unique to these areas of
law. Tax attorneys and specialists frequently call on legislatures to
make the laws more predictable by specifying precisely the manners
of tax minimization that are prohibited and not prohibited. Yet, every
effort to clarify tax legislation produces counterefforts to avoid taxa-
tion while complying with the highly specific letter of the code. 15
Another example of the trade-off between static and dynamic predict-
ability is observed in the regulation of insider trading. Securities trad-
ers generally prefer to have the uncertainty surrounding the scope of
the insider-trading prohibition reduced, and this could be accom-
plished by setting out a precise definition of the acts that fall under the
label "insider trading."'16 Securities regulators are, however, reluctant
to provide this level of specificity, precisely because it would generate
new forms of insider trading that fall outside of the enumerated
prohibitions. 17
Bruno Leoni presented an alternative perspective on the tension
between dynamic and static predictability. 18 Countering Bentham's
claim that statutory law was preferable to common law on static pre-
dictability grounds, Leoni argued that statutory law was inferior on
dynamic predictability grounds.' 9 A system of statutory law presents
a set of rules that can be changed by a shift of perhaps only one vote.
A common-law system, on the other hand, was not subject to shifts in
voting patterns and, because it was relatively immune to such shifts,
15. See generally, Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis and the Law of Conservation of Ambiguity:
Thoughts on Section 385, 36 TAX LAW. 9 (1982). Manning's thesis, which has generated a
healthy debate among tax scholars, is that efforts to clarify the United States Internal Revenue
Code do not reduce the total amount of uncertainty, they merely shift uncertainty from one
provision or clause to another. Id. at 11.
16. For a general overview of the difficulties of defining insider trading, see ROBERT C.
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 320-26, 347-56 (1986).
17. One peculiar aspect of these examples is that the tension between static and dynamic
predictability in tax and securities laws is due in large part to technological change and to efforts
on the part of the regulated groups to avoid compliance with the statutes. Put another way,
there is a "cat and mouse" game observed in these areas that contributes mightily to the uncer-
tainty problem. The "cat and mouse" game is not observed in all areas of law. For example, in
tort law, there is relatively little effort on the part of regulated groups to structure their transac-
tions in a way that avoids compliance (and at the same time conceals that avoidance). That does
not mean that the tension does not exist in tort and other areas, however. The tension would
surely be observed in tort law if courts attempted to provide a precise definition of negligence in
some area of activity.
18. LEONI, supra note 2, at 77-111.
19. Id. at 97-113.
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provided little incentive for individuals to adopt a self-interested re-
form campaign.
Predictable law, then, achieves a high degree of static and dy-
namic predictability (or alternatively minimizes static and dynamic
uncertainty). Although there is no measuring system that permits us
to say how predictable law should be in order to be satisfactory, the
concept of predictability can be used to compare legal systems, or sys-
tems of procedural rules. Just as common- and statutory-law regimes
can be ranked according to the predictability criterion-with, accord-
ing to Leoni, statutory law probably performing best on static
grounds, and common law on dynamic grounds-systems of proce-
dural rules can also be ranked within the common-law regime.
B. The Influence of Procedure on Predictability: A Review of the
Literature
Bentham said a great deal about the predictability of law and pro-
cedural rules, but it seems not to have occurred to him that a simple
tinkering with the procedure might have done something to alleviate
the problems he identified. Of course, Bentham's view is entirely con-
sistent because the problems, as he saw them, were far too large to be
solved by a simple modification of procedural rules. Unpredictability
was an inherent feature of the common-law system in his view. The
only solution was to replace the common law with a system in which
statutes framed in simple words were administered by judges with
very little input by lawyers. 20 Implicit in this is the view that proce-
dural rules have little influence, on the margin, on the predictability of
law.
One has to push forward to Oliver Wendell Holmes to find the
first statement of a theory of the influence of procedure on the pre-
dictability of law, and even here the theory has little to say about al-
ternative procedural rules.21 The model presented by Holmes is
important, however, because it encompasses important features of
some recent contributions to the literature.
Holmes argued that, although the outcome of a case in court was
uncertain, the law itself tended toward increasing predictability over
time.22 This was true, in Holmes's view, in both the static and dy-
20. See, e.g., GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW PROCESS 263-301
(1986).
21. See HOLMES, supra note 2, 111-29.
22. Id.
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namic senses. In terms of static predictability, the law moved toward
certainty along the following lines. The early cases dealt with extreme
propositions and simple applications of the rule. Later cases involved
increasingly difficult boundary issues.2 3 After they were settled in
early cases, the extreme propositions and simple applications were no
longer subjects of dispute. Any case involving a simple application
would settle because the parties could predict the outcome. The only
disputes that were litigated would be those in which the answer was
unclear and difficult to predict on the basis of earlier decisions. As
those cases were decided, however, less and less remained of the areas
in which the law's application was unpredictable.
In the dynamic sense, the law moved toward predictability be-
cause changes in tastes and technology presented new issues that
would have to be resolved by a jury. Thus, the system permitted the
law to change in response to changing conditions, which enhances pre-
dictability because one expects the law to change in response to
changing conditions. Because juries drew on the common sense, hab-
its, and norms of the community, however, the new laws that were
generated could not be called entirely unpredictable. Indeed, because
the new laws were reasonable in light of the jurors' experiences, which
were presumably the same as those of the litigants, one could say they
were foreseeable. 24
Surprisingly, the jury plays an important role in Holmes's argu-
ment, and it is perhaps the only procedural feature in the discussion.
23. For example, an early case might ask whether it was negligence for a pedestrian to cross
a railroad track without first looking in the direction from which the train usually arrives. A
later case might ask whether it was negligence for a pedestrian to cross a railroad track, even
though he looked in the usual direction, when he failed to notice that the tracks for incoming
and outgoing trains had been switched.
24. It may help to consider a visual picture of this process: imagine an iceberg that is contin-
ually replaced so that it maintains its size. The "revealed common law," which consists of the
stock of new court decisions, is the visible portion of the iceberg above water. The litigation
process resolves uncertainty by exposing new parts of the iceberg to the visible surface. This
process does not lead to a reduction in the total amount of uncertainty because the iceberg, by
assumption, is infinitely large. Each decision, however, reduces uncertainty by resolving some
dispute concerning the contour of the iceberg below the water surface.
Suppose the iceberg is of finite size? Then eventually all contours of its body are exposed to
the surface, at which point there is no more uncertainty. As a description of the litigation pro-
cess, this image is consistent with the notion, attributed to Langdell, that the law consists of a
fixed set of basic maxims or principles and that by studying case law one can come to an under-
standing of the entire set of maxims upon which all legal decisions are based. See Thomas C.
Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pr-r. L. REV. 1 (1983). In this view, new decisions reduce
uncertainty only to the extent that they provide a clearer view of the underlying maxims. Of
course, it is unlikely that new decisions make a great contribution to the resolution of uncer-
tainty, under this theory, because one could presumably gain a clear view of the underlying
maxims by studying old decisions.
1995]
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The jury, however, is not necessary for the contribution to dynamic
predictability that Holmes attributes to it. Dynamic predictability
under Holmes's model requires that the court draw on the exper-
iences of the community when confronting new applications of the law
arising with changes in technology or tastes. That function could be
carried out by a judge, provided enough evidence is presented. In-
deed, in order for the jury's role to be constructive in Holmes's the-
ory, quite a lot of power must be exercised by the judge in
determining which questions should be given to the jury to decide.
For if every question were given to the jury, it would be unlikely that
any rules would develop with the permanency and consistency that
one expects of law. 25
In any event, the key implication of Holmes's model is that the
law tends toward predictability as a result of the litigation process. Easy
cases are decided early in the evolution of a legal doctrine, establish-
ing the rules that the vast majority of people comply with on a daily
basis. Later, the easy cases are seldom the subject of legal disputes,
because the parties, aware of the established rule, settle their disputes
quickly. The difficult questions of application are decided as they
arise, in a manner that takes expectations, habits, and norms of the
community into account.
The model described by Holmes has been a central part of eco-
nomic analyses of the predictability of law. For example, Landes's
and Posner's analysis,26 which argues that law moves toward increas-
ing predictability, is in important respects identical to the model ar-
ticulated by Holmes. The analysis of George Priest and Benjamin
Klein,27 probably the most important recent contribution to the study
of the influence of legal procedure on predictability of law, also shares
many important features with Holmes's model.
According to the Priest-Klein model, only the disputes whose
outcome in court is most uncertain are pursued to the point of a judg-
ment. The disputes whose outcome in court is predictable are settled.
This has two implications. On an empirical level, one should expect
25. The system in which all questions are assigned to the jury is equivalent to one in which
decisions have very little or no precedential value. Such a system can be thought of as a
"Markov process" in which alternative rules replace each other randomly. For an examination
of such a process, see Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law
Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 145-50 (1980) (demonstrating, among other
things, that if each of several alternative rules is litigated with positive probability, no single rule
will prevail in the long run).
26. Landes & Posner, supra note 2.
27. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
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the win rate of plaintiffs at trial to be roughly fifty percent, since the
disputes pursued to the point of judgment are as uncertain as coin
tosses. Second, on a more general level, the Priest-Klein analysis im-
plies that the vast bulk of law is unaffected by ordinary litigation. The
established rules affect behavior and influence the terms of settled dis-
putes, but are seldom the subject of new litigation. Hence, a social
scientist who claimed that a recent string of seemingly pro-plaintiff or
pro-defendant court decisions reflected a fundamental shift in legal
doctrine could easily be wrong. It is this second implication that was
almost entirely anticipated by Holmes's analysis.
Although Priest and Klein provided empirical support for the
first implication, it is controversial because the empirical support is
questionable and, more importantly, it suggests that the law may not
move toward increasing predictability as a result of litigation. There is
considerable overlap between these criticisms of the Priest-Klein em-
pirical hypothesis (the fifty percent win-rate rule), but I will discuss
them separately.
The empirical support is questionable because later researchers
have shown that the fifty percent win-rate prediction does not hold
with respect to many subject matters of litigation. Eisenberg has
shown, for example, that medical malpractice and products liability
disputes consistently exhibit plaintiff win rates well below fifty per-
cent.28 A study by Gross and Syverud suggests that as one disaggre-
gates subject areas, for example, from torts to tort-malpractice and so
on, one finds less support for the fifty percent rule. 29
More generally, the fifty percent rule is troubling because it con-
tradicts Holmes's proposition that litigation tends to push the law to-
ward greater predictability. If the fifty percent rule is correct, then the
law is a random walk.30 One step to the left is equally likely to be
followed by a step to the right or another step to the left. Of course, if
the law is a random walk, where does it go? The answer is nowhere.
A basic result of probability theory is that over the long term the ex-
pected deviation of a random walk from a straight path is zero. 31
28. Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with
Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 350-55 (1990).
29. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations
and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 319, 333-35 (1991).
30. Interestingly, in an article published four years before the Priest-Klein study, George
Priest discusses the random-walk implication and expresses a pessimistic view of theories of the
content of common law. See George L. Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399 (1980).
31. Why? Recall that the expected frequency of "heads" resulting from the toss of an
equally balanced coin is fifty percent. The random walk is like a coin toss in which "heads =
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Thus, the Priest-Klein fifty percent rule implies that the law does
not move at all over the long run. If it moves toward greater fairness
or greater efficiency, it does so by chance and is likely to move away if
one waits long enough. It also follows that the law does not move as
the result of litigation toward increasing predictability. Certainly,
static predictability is unlikely to result if the Priest-Klein rule is valid.
An interpretive approach to rules that follows a random path is un-
likely to enhance the clarity of a rule. Dynamic predictability is also
unlikely because, as tastes and technology change, the litigation pro-
cess fails to respond to these changes in a manner that is consistent
with either existing rules or expectations.
Moreover, it follows from the Priest-Klein fifty percent rule that
procedural rules have relatively little influence on the predictability of
law. Under the hypothesis, disputes are litigated because of equally
balanced two-sided uncertainty.32 A change in procedural rules might
change the type of case filed, but the influence of litigation on predict-
ability would remain the same. Thus, surprisingly, the Priest-Klein
model provides a rigorous version of Bentham's view of the common-
law process. 33
Note that I am referring to the implications of the Priest-Klein
fifty percent rule. The more general hypothesis that cases whose out-
comes are predictable tend to settle more frequently than those with
unpredictable outcomes is not inconsistent with Holmes's model; in-
deed, it is a central claim of Holmes's model. The empirical evidence
does not refute this prediction.34 In addition, one could argue that the
Priest-Klein model assumes a world in which the legal standard is
fixed, i.e., where there is no legal change. Hence, it is perfectly consis-
right step" and "tails = left step." Thus, over the long run, the number of left steps should be the
same as the number of right steps. For an introduction to random walks, see C.W.J. GRANGER
& PAUL NEwBoLD, FORECASTING ECONOMIc TIME SERIES 38 (1977).
32. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 188 (1993) [hereinafter Hylton, Asymmetric Information].
33. 1 am referring to the fifty percent rule in particular. To be more precise, the Priest-
Klein fifty percent rule implies that the predictability of law is not affected by minor changes in
procedural rules, such as a change in the fee-shifting rule. In addition, it implies that, if the law is
crystal clear at date zero, it will meander randomly, but in the long term return to its firm rule.
On the other hand, if the law is unclear at date zero, the law will meander randomly and fail to
move in the direction of greater clarity. This implication is strange in light of Priest's earlier
claim that common law tends to generate economically efficient rules. See George L. Priest, The
Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65-66 (1977).
34. In the area of employment discrimination, the predictable cases tend to settle, while the
unpredictable ones are litigated. This holds even though win rates are much less than fifty per-
cent in this area. Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of Employment Dis-
crimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest/Klein
Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1995).
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tent that the model implies the path taken by new decisions is a ran-
dom walk. But this argument essentially limits the fifty percent rule to
a very small set of disputes, which is surely not the interpretation sug-
gested by the Priest-Klein article. One could also argue that the
Priest-Klein model allows for plaintiff win rates that deviate signifi-
cantly from fifty percent when the parties have asymmetric stakes.35
There are, however, so few areas of litigation in which fifty percent
win rates are observed;36 one would have to say, to remain consistent
with their model, that almost all litigation involves parties with asym-
metric stakes. But that is also hard to square with the empirical
evidence. 37
The foregoing suggests that the predictability thesis would be in
poor shape if the fifty percent rule of Priest and Klein were valid. The
empirical evidence suggests, however, that it is not valid, as a general
rule. In related work, I have developed a model that suggests that
where there is one-sided uncertainty, or asymmetric information, win
rates will diverge significantly from the fifty percent prediction. 38 The
theory is consistent with the low plaintiff win rates observed in medi-
cal malpractice and products liability litigation, which are areas in
which defendants generally have an advantage in predicting the out-
come of a trial. The Priest-Klein result is observed as a special case in
which two-sided uncertainty is present.
To this point I have argued that the early literature has implica-
tions for the influence of procedural rules on predictability. The first
direct examination of this question was carried out by J. Robert S.
Prichard. Taking advantage of the contributions of Landes, 39 Pos-
ner,40 Gould,41 and especially Shavell,42 Prichard argued that the
35. This was part of their original argument. See Priest & Klein, supra note 27, at 24-29.
36. See Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 357-58.
37. See Hylton, Asymmetric Information, supra note 32, at 201-02.
38. Id. This model builds on a larger literature examining litigation incentives under asym-
metric information. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect
Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984); Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation, 18
RAND J. ECON. 198 (1987); I.P.L. Png, Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care, 34 J. PUBLIC
ECON. 61 (1987). One might ask how, in light of discovery rules, asymmetric information could
have a substantial influence on the conduct of litigation? For an analysis, see Bruce L. Hay,
Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1995).
39. William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971).
40. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Adminis-
tration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
41. John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973).
42. Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL. STUD. 55 (1982). For an interesting
critique of Shavell's analysis, see John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner
and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1991).
1995]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
American rule tended to encourage novel legal claims while the Brit-
ish rule discouraged such claims.43 As a result, the British system
seemed to be characterized by a higher degree of predictability, mani-
fested by stricter observance of precedents, fewer dissenting opinions,
and a greater commitment to law as a system of rules. 44 Prichard did
not distinguish between static and dynamic predictability, but he
seemed to think that both types of predictability were greater under
the British procedural system. Although several features contributed
to this difference, Prichard emphasized the different cost-allocation
rules and the rules governing the financing of lawsuits.45
Prichard took no clear position on whether the law is pushed in
the direction of greater predictability as a result of litigation. The gen-
eral thrust of the argument, however, suggests a belief that litigation is
capable of enhancing predictability. But, as I have suggested, there
are several questions that remain to be addressed. In the remainder
of this Article, I will re-examine the influence of cost-shifting rules on
the predictability of law and follow with implications for the influence
of procedure on substance.
III. INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE COST ALLOCATION
RULES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PREDICTABILITY
Prichard's examination of the influence of cost-allocation rules on
predictability of law relies on Shavell's analysis of the incentives cre-
ated by the American and British rules. In this section, I re-examine
the implications of Shavell's work and incorporate those of recent
contributions.
A. Litigation Incentive Effects
Cost-allocation rules influence the substance of law through two
channels: compliance and selection effects. By compliance effects, I
mean effects on incentives of injurers to comply with the law. 46 They
are important because an allocation rule that leads to greater compli-
ance reduces the number of injuries that could give rise to legal dis-
putes and affects the characteristics of the typical dispute. This, in
turn, affects the issues that will be litigated. For example, if almost all
43. Prichard, supra note 3, at 452 n.2.
44. Id. at 453.
45. Id. at 455.
46. Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance with the Negligence
Standard, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 457, 457 (1993) [hereinafter Hylton, Litigation Cost Allocation
Rules].
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injurers are complying with the law, then the typical dispute is likely
to involve weak or novel legal claims. Conversely, if few injurers are
complying with the law, then the pool of injuries that could give rise to
disputes will include a large percentage of strong, "core-violation"
claims. The mix of novel and core-violation cases flowing through the
courts is likely to affect the substance of legal doctrine. 47
By selection effects, I refer to influences on the incentives to file
suit and to settle. Prichard's analysis was concerned largely with the
selection effects of alternative cost-allocation rules. A cost-allocation
rule that has the effect of encouraging novel or relatively weak claims
is likely to have an impact on the predictability of law and its
substance.
Since I am reconsidering the implications of Shavell's analysis, it
will help to introduce the terms he used, as well as a few new terms.
Assume the probability of an injury to a victim occurring is p, if an
injurer fails to take care, and q, if the injurer takes care. Let the loss
to the injured victim be J. Let the litigation costs of the plaintiff be Cp
and the costs for the defendant be Cd. Let Pd be the defendant's esti-
mate of the likelihood of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and let Pp
be the plaintiff's estimate of the likelihood of a verdict in his favor.
1. Compliance Effects
Recent contributions have demonstrated that cost-allocation
rules affect incentives to comply with the law.48 The allocation rule
affects the expected liability of an injurer. An allocation rule that
forces a potential defendant to pay higher costs increases expected
liability. Assuming the injurer is rational, he is more likely to take
care or to comply with the relevant law after an increase in expected
liability.
The compliance effects of a change in the cost-allocation rule can
be divided into two components. One reflects new incentives, for the
injurer, created by changing expected liability. The other reflects
changes in the victim's incentive to bring suit.
a. Liability Effect
To see the effect of alternative cost-allocation rules on incentives
to comply, let us compare the American and British rules. For sim-
47. Hylton, Asymmetric Information, supra note 32, at 204-05.
48. Hylton, Litigation Cost Allocation Rules, supra note 46; Avery Katz, Law and Econom-
ics Discussion Paper (1994) (unpublished paper, Georgetown University Law Center).
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plicity, assume (1) that every injured victim sues and (2) that the court
operates without error, so that the careful defendant expects to win
while the careless defendant expects to lose.
Under the American rule, each party bears its own litigation ex-
penses. If the court operates without error, so that the defendant is
held liable only if he failed to take care, then under the American rule
the expected liability of an injurer who failed to take care is pJ + pCd.
The expected liability of an injurer who takes care is qCd. Thus, the
increase in expected liability that results from failing to take care is pJ
+ (p-q)Cd.
Under the British rule, the expected liability of an injurer who
fails to take care is pJ + pCp + pCd, and in the case of an injurer who
takes care, the expected liability is $0. Thus, under the British rule,
the increase in expected liability that results from failing to take care
is the full expected liability of a careless injurer. Because (p-q)Cd <
p(Cp+Cd), the following result may be stated.
Result 1: The incentive to take care is greater under the British than
under the American rule.49
A numerical example may make this discussion clearer. Suppose
the probability of an injury to a victim occurring is .75 if an injurer
fails to take care and .25 if the injurer takes care. Suppose the loss to
the victim is $2. Let the litigation costs of the plaintiff and the defend-
ant be $1 each. If the court operates without error, under the Ameri-
can rule the expected liability of an injurer who failed to take care is
(.75)($2) + (.75)($1) = $2.25.
The expected liability of an injurer who takes care is
(.25)($0) + (.25)($1) = $0.25.
Thus, the increase in expected liability that results from failing to take
care is $2. If the cost of taking care is greater than $2, the rational
injurer will not take care, and conversely.
Under the British rule, the expected liability of an injurer who
fails to take care is
(.75)($2) + (.75)($2) = $3.00
and in the case of an injurer who takes care, the expected liability is
$0. Thus, the increase in expected liability that results from failing to
take care is $3. Because the increase in liability is greater under the
British rule, one should observe greater compliance under it than
under the American rule. All injurers for whom the cost of taking
49. Using a similar argument, it is easily demonstrated that the Pro-plaintiff rule is
equivalent to the British in this analysis.
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care is less than $2.00 take care under the American rule, while all
injurers for whom the cost of taking care is less than $3.00 take care
under the British rule. It is easy to show that the Pro-plaintiff rule is
equivalent to the British rule in this example.
b. Compliance-Selection Feedback
The examples above suggest that the British and Pro-plaintiff
rules generate greater compliance than the American rule. The gen-
eral level of compliance affects incentives to bring suit. If everyone
complies with the law, then potential plaintiffs will know that the
probability of a victory is small and will therefore be less likely to
sue.50 A decline in the likelihood of a lawsuit, however, reduces the
deterrent effect of liability.
An analysis that focuses on injurer incentives is incomplete be-
cause it fails to consider the full impact of a change in the cost-alloca-
tion rule. Consider, for example, a shift from the American to the
British rule. The shift increases expected liability and so leads in the
first round to an increase in the level of care, but an increase in care
across the board reduces the incentive to bring suit, which dampens
the increase in care. The net result is that the level of care does not
increase to the full extent suggested by an analysis that focuses only
on the injurer's expected liability. Indeed, the level of care may fall in
the event that the victim's incentive to sue is substantially lessened.51
Result 2: The difference between caretaking incentives under the
American rule and under the British rule is dampened by their respec-
tive influences on the incentive to bring suit.
The outcome in which compliance incentives are totally undone
by the reduction in incentives to sue is not observed in the case of a
shift from the American to the Pro-plaintiff rule. Although any in-
crease in compliance reduces incentives to sue, the Pro-plaintiff rule is
always at least as encouraging of lawsuits as is the American rule. The
British rule is distinguishable because the victim who brings a low
probability claim under it faces the (correspondingly) high probability
of having to pay the defendant's legal expenses.
50. See Janusz A. Ordover, Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 243, 244 (1978).
51. See Hylton, Litigation Cost Allocation Rules, supra note 46, at 459.
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2. Selection Effects
I now examine selection effects, which can be subdivided into fil-
ing and settlement effects. "Filing effects" includes influences on the
plaintiff's incentive to bring a lawsuit. "Settlement effects" includes
influences on the parties' incentives to settle a lawsuit that has been
filed.
a. Filing Effect
A plaintiff files a lawsuit if the expected award exceeds the ex-
pected loss. It follows that under the American rule, the plaintiff will
file a lawsuit if the expected value of the claim, PpJ - Cp, is positive.
What gains or losses would a plaintiff under the American rule experi-
ence if he were put under the British rule? The plaintiff would gain
the value of his litigation expenses multiplied by his perception of the
probability of plaintiff victory in court. The plaintiff would lose the
value of the defendant's litigation expenses multiplied by his percep-
tion of the probability that the plaintiff loses in court. Thus, the plain-
tiff is more likely to sue under the British rule if he experiences a net
gain in the expected value of the lawsuit by being shifted from the
American to the British rule, which occurs if PpCp - (1-Pp)Cd is posi-
tive. It follows that suit is more likely to be brought under the British
rule if Pp > Cd/(Cd+Cp) or, in words, if the plaintiff's estimate of the
likelihood of winning is greater than the defendant's share of the total
litigation expense.52 This has two implications:
Result 3: The British rule provides more encouragement to opti-
mistic plaintiffs than does the American rule.
Result 4: Defendants who can credibly commit to large litigation
expenses are less likely to be sued under the British than under the
American rule.
b. Settlement Effect
The second type of selection effect concerns incentives to litigate
rather than settle a dispute. The incentive to litigate depends on the
perceived stakes (PpJ for the plaintiff and PdJ for the defendant) and
the total costs of litigating (Cd+Cp). If the difference in perceived
stakes is larger than the total costs, the parties are likely to litigate,
because both think the payoff from litigating far exceeds that from
settling. The converse holds if the difference in perceived stakes is
52. Shavell, supra note 42, at 59.
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less than the total costs. By shifting expenses from the winning to the
losing party, the British rule increases the perceived stakes and there-
fore encourages litigation. The basic result is as follows:
Result 5: The incentive to litigate rather than settle a dispute is
greater under the British than under the American rule.
The Pro-plaintiff and American rules can be subjected to the
same analysis. The incentive to bring suit is greater under the Pro-
plaintiff rule than under either the American or British rule. More-
over, unlike the American rule, and like the British rule, the Pro-
plaintiff rule gives the greatest amount of encouragement to high
probability claims. Unlike the British rule, and like the American
rule, the Pro-plaintiff rule does not present a special disincentive to
low probability claims.
The incentive to litigate rather than settle is greater under the
Pro-plaintiff rule than under the American rule. The incentive to liti-
gate is, however, less under the Pro-plaintiff rule than under the Brit-
ish rule. The reason is that the Pro-plaintiff rule enhances the
perceived stakes, but not as much as does the British rule.
B. Implications for Predictability of Law: Re-examination of the
British and American Rules
1. Predictability
Prichard relied on Result 3 in framing the hypothesis that the
British rule generated a greater degree of predictability. The greater
predictability hypothesis seems plausible because optimistic plaintiffs
will tend to be those whose claims are solidly grounded in existing law.
Plaintiffs whose claims are weakly grounded in law are relatively dis-
couraged by the British rule.
Thus, Result 3 suggests that the British rule leads to a more stable
body of law. The stability results because the claims that are brought
tend to be firmly grounded in the law, while novel and other claims
weakly grounded in law are discouraged. The law tends to reproduce
itself under this system, with relatively few attempted invasions of the
established order by new legal claims.
This analysis, however, which focuses on the incentive to bring
suit, is incomplete. The low probability claims discouraged by the
British rule include novel legal arguments and well-grounded legal
claims in which the evidence of violation is weak. Thus, one implica-
tion of this analysis is that strong legal claims based on weak evidence
are disfavored by the British rule. Many claims of fraud, misrepresen-
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tation, or discrimination are likely to fall in this category. The claim
of violation may be solidly grounded in law in many of these disputes,
and yet it will often be that the facts are ambiguous and permit com-
peting inferences in even the strongest cases in this class.
Result 4 introduces another new consideration: in areas of litiga-
tion in which defendants typically devote large sums to their defense,
plaintiffs will be relatively reluctant to sue under the British rule. The
reason is that the plaintiff who litigates takes the risk that he will have
to pay an enormous legal bill for the opposing party. Simply threaten-
ing such a charge may be enough to discourage some plaintiffs from
filing.
This suggests that wealthy or large corporate defendants who
commit themselves to high-priced law firms will tend to gain a greater
degree of immunity from suit under the British rule. The immunity
results not from the substantive law, but from the penalty that may be
imposed on an unsuccessful plaintiff.
Result 4 has important implications for the predictability thesis,
for it suggests that some of the claims well grounded in law will actu-
ally be discouraged by the British rule-specifically, those against de-
fendants who have committed themselves to large litigation expenses.
Put another way, the British rule enables some defendants to strategi-
cally preclude lawsuits by committing themselves to high litigation ex-
penses. This suggests that the law governing defendants in this class
will tend to be less predictable.
What about Results 1 and 2? They show that compliance is en-
hanced by the British rule (in comparison to the American), but that
the compliance effect is probably not great. 53 If the compliance effect
were substantial, then the results would provide additional support to
the claim that the British system tends to discourage low probability
claims. It would suggest that the equilibrium is not due entirely to
costs; low probability claims are deterred in part because people as-
sume correctly that others are complying with the law. As Result 2
suggests, however, the compliance effect is probably not an important
difference between the American and British rules. The compliance
effect becomes an important part of the analysis when we examine the
Pro-plaintiff rule in a later section of this Article.
Result 5 undercuts Prichard's claim of greater stability under the
British rule. Although novel claims are less likely to be filed under
the British rule, those claims that are filed are more likely to be liti-
53. See Hylton, Litigation Cost Allocation Rules, supra note 46.
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gated, rather than settled. If courts occasionally err, the result is that
the existing law will be occasionally muddied by a holding that cannot
be reconciled with it.54 Thus, although novel claims are seldom filed,
established law is at greater risk of being made to appear less certain
under the British rule.55
The implications of Result 5 are somewhat broader when one
takes into account informational disparities among litigants. In some
instances, either the defendant or the plaintiff may have an informa-
tional advantage in litigation, which permits the advantaged party to
make a more accurate prediction of the outcome of a trial. One can
categorize areas of litigation as follows: (1) where both plaintiff and
defendant are uninformed; (2) where both plaintiff and defendant are
informed; (3) where the plaintiff is informed and the defendant unin-
formed; and (4) where the defendant is informed and the plaintiff
uninformed. 56
When both parties are informed, we should expect settlement. If
there is no disagreement as to the outcome of a trial, both parties will
realize that a trial would only result in a wasteful expenditure of re-
sources. When neither party is informed, we have the case of equally-
balanced, two-sided uncertainty assumed in the Priest-Klein litigation
model. The interesting cases are those in which one of the parties
enjoys an advantage. If the defendant enjoys an advantage, the guilty
defendants will tend to settle their disputes, generating a high percent-
age of weak claims in the pool of litigated disputes.5 7 Conversely,
when plaintiffs are advantaged, weak plaintiffs tend to settle their dis-
putes, generating a relatively high percentage of strong claims in the
pool of litigated disputes.58
The upshot is that the predictability implications of the British
and American rules depend to some extent on the presence of infor-
mational disparity. In the Priest-Klein scenario of equally-balanced,
two-sided uncertainty, the American and British rules will generate
equal proportions of strong and weak claims pursued to a judgment.
54. And this returns us to Cooter and Kornhauser's "Markov process" in which alternative
rules replace each other periodically. See Cooter & Kornhauser, supra note 25, at 145-50.
55. It may be helpful to consider an example. Suppose the probability that a case does not
settle is .8 under the British rule and .4 under the American rule, which is suggested by Result 5.
Suppose the rate of erroneous reversals of established law is .15 under the American rule and .1
under the British. Then even though the British rule has a lower error rate in this example, the
frequency with which a filed claim leads to an erroneous reversal will be greater under the Brit-
ish rule (.06 under the American, .08 under the British).
56. Hylton, Asymmetric Information, supra note 32, at 188-89.
57. Id. at 189-90.
58. Id. at 199.
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The British rule, as Result 5 indicates, will simply produce more
litigation.
If, on the other hand, the defendant has an informational advan-
tage, the British rule will exacerbate the tendency of the litigation pro-
cess to screen out relatively strong claims. The reason is that with
two-way fee shifting, guilty defendants will have a strong incentive to
settle and uninformed plaintiffs facing innocent defendants will have a
strong incentive to litigate. Why? The informed defendant who is
guilty has a strong incentive to settle under the British rule because he
knows that a verdict against him will result in liability for both the
injury and the litigation expenses of plaintiff. The result is that a
larger percentage of guilty defendants settle. Why not all guilty de-
fendants? An outcome in which all guilty defendants settle could not
sustain itself as an equilibrium. If all guilty defendants settled, plain-
tiffs' attorneys would know that the defendants who refused to settle
were innocent and would drop their cases. But then guilty defendants
would realize that by hanging in longer, mimicking the actions of in-
nocent defendants, they could avoid all liability whatsoever. The
likely result is a "pooling" equilibrium in which guilty defendants are
indifferent between the options of accepting and rejecting the plain-
tiff's settlement demand. Introduction of the British rule increases the
cost of rejecting, so a larger percentage of guilty defendants accept.
As more guilty defendants exit (by settling), however, the signalling
value of rejection increases, making it more valuable to the remaining
guilties to reject the plaintiff's settlement demand. Equilibrium is re-
stored when the guilty defendant is indifferent between accepting and
rejecting, and, since this requires that rejection have a higher signal-
ling value, it follows that the pool of litigating defendants must be
"cleaner" in the sense of having fewer guilty defendants. 59
Finally, suppose the plaintiff has the informational advantage.
Then, for reasons similar to those just stated, the British rule will exac-
erbate the tendency of the litigation process to screen out relatively
weak claims.
These considerations suggest that the tendency of the British rule
to encourage relatively strong claims is not uniform across all subject
matters of litigation. Pick an area in which defendants are likely to
have an informational advantage. In that area, the British rule will
generate a higher frequency of litigation of those claims that are filed
(and not dropped) and will also tend to encourage the weakest of
59. For further details, see id. at 187-205.
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those claims to go to court (as opposed to settlement). This, of course,
is quite inconsistent with the thesis that the British rule encourages
predictability and stability of law.
The foregoing suggests that Prichard's preliminary conclusion
that law is more predictable under the British system is difficult to
support on the basis of theoretical speculation. Though Prichard
never distinguished between static and dynamic predictability, his ar-
guments concern the former. It is not at all clear, however, that the
British system enhances static predictability. The British system en-
ables defendants who commit to high expenses to virtually bar some
high probability claims, which weakens static predictability. In addi-
tion, the British rule encourages litigation rather than settlement of
claims that are filed, which implies courts will tend to revisit estab-
lished doctrines at a higher frequency under the British than under the
American rule. The process of constantly revisiting established doc-
trines enhances the risk that some will be overturned occasionally as
the result of error. Finally, in those areas of litigation in which de-
fendants have an informational advantage, the British rule will tend to
encourage litigation of relatively weak claims.
In terms of dynamic predictability, it is unlikely that the British
rule is preferable to the American. Technology and tastes change
over time, and predictability therefore requires a system that is capa-
ble of reshaping itself to meet the expectations generated by new con-
ditions. The process of reshaping is enhanced by the court's
consideration of novel claims. A procedural system, such as the Brit-
ish, that discourages such claims is not well suited to this task.
2. Substance
The implications of the American and British rules for substan-
tive differences in the law were largely explained by Prichard. The
previous section suggests, however, that Occam's razor could have
been applied with even greater force than in Prichard's discussion: it
may be possible to attribute many of the substantive law differences
identified by Prichard to the different incentives created by the British
and American cost-allocation rules.60 In addition, the incentives cre-
ated by the cost-allocation rules have some substantive implications
that are inconsistent with Prichard's thesis.
60. Prichard relied on rules governing fee shifting, the financing of litigation, and the bring-
ing of class action suits as determinants of the differences in substantive law in America and
Britain. I am suggesting here that many of the differences described by Prichard could be attrib-
uted to the fee-shifting rules alone.
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Prichard attributes certain differences in the British and Ameri-
can law to the greater ease with which group litigation can be brought
in America. But many of the substantive law differences Prichard at-
tributes to class action and similar procedural rules (e.g., derivative
suits) could be explained by the different incentives created by the
British and American cost-allocation rules.
Consider, for example, Prichard's observation that American cor-
porate law is more detailed and "developed" than British corporate
law.61 He attributes this largely to the incentives provided for deriva-
tive suits in America. The relative underdevelopment of British cor-
porate law could also be explained, however, by the different cost-
allocation rules. The British rule discourages low probability claims,
including those well grounded in law but supported by ambiguous evi-
dence. The negligence and fraud claims typically involved in share-
holder derivative actions in America are often based on ambiguous
evidence. Indeed, the problem is inherent in the legal definition of a
corporation. It is a standard form contract or a series of short, stan-
dard form contracts connected with a number of complicated implicit
agreements. The definitions of diligence and negligence are seldom, if
ever, explicitly stated. A negligence claim against the directors and
officers, therefore, will probably involve ambiguous evidence. They
will generally be perceived to be low probability claims and thus less
attractive under the British rule.
A second explanation attributable to the cost-allocation rules is
that the British rule enables corporations to strategically preclude
claims by committing themselves to high litigation expenses. If corpo-
rations act in this manner, then only plaintiffs with the strongest
claims will file suit against them.62 The result is a legal system in
which the law governing such corporations seems underdeveloped in
comparison to American law.
The incentive to strategically preclude lawsuits may also explain
the observation that British law firms have not been subjected to the
kind of competitive cost-cutting pressures applied by large corporate
clients in America.63 The greater survival in Britain of practices, such
as the sharing of profits on a relatively equal basis, lock-step increas-
ing of compensation, and committing to hierarchy based on seniority
61. Prichard, supra note 3, at 463 (quoting L.C.B. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British
and American Corporation Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1956)).
62. This is consistent with anecdotal reports that American tort litigation "dwarfs" that in
Britain. See "On Trial," A Survey of the Legal Profession, ECONOMIST, July 18, 1992, at 11.
63. Id. at 5-6.
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within the firm, 64 may be a reflection not of culture, but of the willing-
ness of corporate clients to pay a luxury tax. Clients are willing to pay
the tax because the act of committing themselves to expensive law
firms has a deterrent effect among potential plaintiffs.
To see the new substantive implications suggested by this analy-
sis, consider medical malpractice litigation. It is an area in which the
negligence rule has been in place for years. There is little novel, at the
level of theory, about a medical malpractice claim. The difficult and
novel questions are factual, and "fact-law" issues are generated by the
appearance of new technology.65 Thus, many claims that are well
grounded in negligence doctrine are likely to be discouraged under
the British rule because the evidence of a violation is not easily estab-
lished. This prediction is consistent with the Snyder and Hughes study
of Florida medical malpractice claims, which found a higher percent-
age of cases dropped under the British rule.66
For those cases that are filed and not dropped, the question is
whether the British rule tends to encourage the litigation of relatively
strong claims. This is unlikely because medical malpractice is an area
in which defendants have an informational advantage in litigation.
Thus, medical malpractice litigation under the British rule will tend to
involve a higher percentage of relatively weak claims. Whether the
typical claim is weaker than that brought under the American rule is
unclear. The British rule results in a higher percentage of weak claims
not being filed, or being filed and dropped. The American rule tends
to encourage relatively strong claims into court, but these claims are
drawn out of a pool that is generally weaker than would be observed
under the British rule.
The likely result is that medical malpractice claims litigated under
the British rule and under the American rule are of roughly the same
merit. If this is so, the major impact of the British rule is that it dis-
courages low probability claims. In the area of medical malpractice,
however, these claims will tend to be those based on new technology.
The major implication, then, is that medical malpractice litigation
under the British rule will put a damper on the process, described by
Mark Grady,67 in which new technology gives rise to ever more strin-
gent negligence tests.
64. Id.
65. Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent?: Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and
the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 293 (1988).
66. Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORO. 345 (1990).
67. Grady, supra note 65.
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IV. TOWARD A NORMATIVE THEORY OF PROCEDURAL RULES
A. Pro-plaintiff Rule and Predictability
I have tried to demonstrate that the British and American cost-
allocation rules are not very different in their implications for the pre-
dictability of law. In this section, I will argue that the ideal rule on
predictability grounds is the Pro-plaintiff. The Pro-plaintiff rule incor-
porates the desirable features of the British and American rules while
avoiding the undesirable.
The important characteristics of the Pro-plaintiff rule are as fol-
lows. First, like the British rule, the incentive to litigate under the
Pro-plaintiff rule increases substantially as the merit of the claim in-
creases.68 Second, like the American rule, the Pro-plaintiff rule does
not introduce a special disincentive to low probability claimants.
Third, and most important, the Pro-plaintiff rule goes further than any
other in removing costs as an obstacle to plaintiffs with valid claims.
Fourth, the Pro-plaintiff rule does not encourage litigation over the
settlement of filed claims as strongly as does the British rule.69
There is a fifth characteristic that deserves separate treatment:
the compliance effect. I noted in the previous section that compliance
incentives generated by the British and American rules were similar.
The reason is that although the British rule increases the liability of
injurers, it reduces the incentive of victims to bring suit. The Pro-
plaintiff rule, however, increases the expected liability of injurers
without reducing the incentive to file a valid claim and, therefore, has
a substantial impact on compliance.
The connection between the compliance effect and predictability
is not obvious in the analysis of the preceding section, but there is a
straightforward intuitive explanation. A regime of high compliance
enhances predictability as follows. In a high compliance regime, ac-
tors comply with the laws and also the norms, conventions, and expec-
68. To see this, consider two claims, alike except for the probability of victory by the plain-
tiff. Suppose the cost of litigating is $1, and the expected judgment is $2. Suppose the plaintiff's
probability of victory is .8 in one case and .9 in the other. For the lower merit plaintiff, the
expected gain from bringing suit is
(.8)($2) - (.2)($1) = $1.60 - .20 = $1.40.
For the high merit plaintiff the expected gain from suit is
(.9)($2) - (.1)($1) = $1.80 - .10 = $1.70.
Under the American rule, the expected gain for the lower merit plaintiff is $.60, and for the
higher merit plaintiff $.80. Thus, the Pro-plaintiff rule gives greater encouragement to high merit
claims than does the American rule.
69. It should be noted that the Pro-plaintiff rule does imply a greater incentive to litigate a
filed claim than does the American rule. My point is that the incentive to litigate rather than to
settle is weaker than under the British rule.
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tations on which the laws are based. The greater the level of
compliance, the firmer and more stable are the underlying
expectations.
This might seem to be an argument for massive amounts of litiga-
tion, but that need not follow. 70 A regime of high compliance may
minimize litigation.71 First, by reducing the number of injuries that
give rise to disputes, encouraging compliance reduces litigation. Sec-
ond, the greater the level of compliance, the greater the expectation
on the part of potential litigants that, in unclear cases, the defendant
actually complied with the law. This leads plaintiffs to settle their dis-
putes rather than hold out for large damage judgments.
As I noted earlier, the existence of informational asymmetry
among litigants can further complicate efforts to link the merit of the
typical claim to the type of fee-shifting rule. Recall that when the
defendant is informed and the plaintiff is uninformed, the British rule,
when compared to the American rule, may have the effect of encour-
aging weaker claims into court. The same charge might be leveled
against the Pro-plaintiff rule. The important differences, however, are
that the Pro-plaintiff rule does not encourage as much litigation as
does the British rule, and, while the American and British rules are
fairly similar in their influences on compliance, the Pro-plaintiff rule
has a substantially bigger impact on compliance than either the Amer-
ican or British rules.72 These differences suggest that the Pro-plaintiff
rule is unlikely to present the risk to predictability that the British rule
presents in this area.
The first, second, and fourth characteristics of the Pro-plaintiff
rule are important for static predictability purposes. Because the in-
centive to litigate increases with the merit of the claim, the Pro-plain-
tiff rule, like the British rule, supplies the greatest encouragement to
claims that are firmly grounded in the law. One might argue that it is
also desirable that the rule discourage low probability claims, but this
is not clearly desirable. Many low probability claims may be well
70. In other words, I must distinguish my argument from the "public goods" theory of liti-
gation advanced perhaps most forcefully in Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073
(1984). The public goods theory holds that litigation is desirable because it results in clear state-
ments of the law, which is a general benefit. I am not calling for more litigation. The public
goods theory of litigation is not central to the theory of this Article, and I have rejected it in
earlier work. See Hylton, Fee Shifting, supra note 4, at 1075-76.
71. Thus, it does not follow that the Pro-plaintiff rule will lead to a large surge in filings,
stressing the capacity of courts to make informed decisions. If compliance increases, and plain-
tiffs assume that a higher percentage of defendants actually complied with the law, the number
of complaints might fall, and the frequency of settlements might increase.
72. Hylton, Litigation Cost Allocation Rules, supra note 46.
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grounded in law, while lacking in supporting evidence. The object of
common law in this instance is to develop rules specifying the stan-
dard of proof and adequacy of evidence. The decisions may be inter-
preted by some as dealing only with the standard of proof, but they
can equally well be viewed as determining substantive law.73 In light
of this function, procedural rules should be designed to encourage
claims of this sort. It enhances static predictability to know what the
standard of proof requires with respect to these claims.
Still, one might argue that the British rule is superior because at
least some of the low probability claims that are discouraged by it are
nonmeritorious. These claims, if successful, can only lead to confusion
over the meaning of a rule.
Consider, for example, the interpretation of a statute, such as the
Sherman Act. The British rule, by encouraging claims well grounded
in law and discouraging others, would tend to produce a stable and
consistent interpretation. The Pro-plaintiff rule, which is actually ap-
plied, leads to a rapidly evolving law at the cost of stability and consis-
tency. One benefit of the Pro-plaintiff rule, however, is that it
encourages low probability claims that establish evidentiary standards
under the Sherman Act. One large class of claims falling in this cate-
gory are the conscious parallelism charges involved in the famous In-
terstate Circuit v. United States74 and Theater Enterprises v. Paramount
Film Distrib. Corp.75 decisions. The conscious parallelism cases in-
volve conspiracy claims based on circumstantial evidence. Because
they are necessarily low probability claims, it is unlikely that they
would be brought under a British fee-shifting rule. It is beyond dis-
pute that consideration of these claims provides an important set of
doctrines connected to the conspiracy section of the Sherman Act.
Still, one might argue that a decision such as Interstate Circuit,
which lays out several types of circumstantial evidence that a court
should consider in examining the merit of a conscious parallelism con-
spiracy claim,76 harms the predictability of law by setting up compli-
cated, fact-dependent tests. Specifically, the Court in Interstate Circuit
discussed the extent to which the parties charged with conspiracy
shared information, the complexity of their parallel actions, and the
extent to which the evidence suggested that at least some of the par-
73. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 120-21.
74. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
75. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
76. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 225-30.
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ties were motivated by purely independent interests.77 Surely, one
could contend that it cannot enhance predictability for a court to be
charged with the responsibility of sifting through the facts to resolve
these questions.
If one views predictability in the static sense alone, the answer to
this question is probably negative: complicated, fact-dependent legal
tests tend to reduce predictability. Correspondingly, bright-line rules
enhance predictability. The problem is that bright-line rules are in-
flexible in the face of changing conditions. The factors announced in
Interstate Circuit are lines of inquiry that follow naturally from the
theory of the statute. To apply Section 1 of the Sherman Act in a
manner consistent with the underlying theory would seem to require
consideration of the Interstate Circuit factors. An approach that ad-
heres to the theory of the statute is likely to reach sensible answers
when applied to novel fact settings, which enhances dynamic predict-
ability. In other words, bright-line or "per se" rules often enhance
static predictability while weakening dynamic predictability. 78
Further, complexity alone cannot be relied on as a reason for re-
jecting law on predictability grounds. A large number of conventions
involve complex rules that would be difficult to spell out in full. Insti-
tutions, such as families and businesses, develop bodies of common
law that are as complicated and fact dependent as that generated by
courts.79 And yet, the common law within these institutions, such as
the "law of the shop" in the employment context, is often quite pre-
dictable to the parties involved. Contracts are also complicated in
many settings, and require difficult fact-dependent assessments. But
this does not imply that the parties cannot understand their
agreement.
The discussion of Interstate Circuit suggests the existence of an
overlap between sources of static and dynamic uncertainty. Decisions
establishing the standard of proof under a statute address problems of
static and dynamic uncertainty at the same time. They reduce static
uncertainty by contributing to the understanding of the statute's scope
of application. They reduce dynamic uncertainty because they estab-
77. Id. at 226-27.
78. There are counterexamples. A bright-line rule that driving on the left side of the street
is negligence per se will hardly raise the kind of dynamic predictability problems as the more
expansive per se doctrines of antitrust. Thus, bright-line rules that are limited to a specific action
are easier to defend on predictability grounds. I do not see the existence of per se rules in tort
law, for example, as inconsistent with the argument in the text.
79. AMOS, supra note 2, at 21-22, 43-44, 48-51.
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lish rules covering new conditions, unforeseen at the time the statute
was drafted.
Thus, it is unlikely that the British rule is superior to the Pro-
plaintiff rule on static uncertainty grounds. The British rule is argua-
bly superior as a procedural rule designed to throw light on the estab-
lished interpretation of a given statute. Another class of static
uncertainty problems, referred to earlier as rule identification, is, how-
ever, probably best solved through the use of the Pro-plaintiff rule.
Though it is not clear whether the Pro-plaintiff rule is superior to
the British on static grounds, this should be true as far as dynamic
predictability is concerned. The reason is that the Pro-plaintiff rule
goes further than any other rule in removing costs as an obstacle to
valid claims. If law is going to evolve in a manner that responds to
changing conditions, then it is important that there be as few obstacles
as possible in the way of valid claims.
One might argue that the Pro-plaintiff rule also encourages nui-
sance or nonmeritorious claims. The weaknesses in this argument are
two. First, it is the responsibility of courts to distinguish meritorious
and nonmeritorious claims and to sanction bad faith litigants. The
best way to discourage nonmeritorious suits is to enhance the power
of courts to make these distinctions and penalize bad-faith litigants,
not to make it difficult to bring any claim regardless of merit. Second,
because the Pro-plaintiff rule makes a greater contribution to predict-
ability than the American rule, it should be easier over time for courts
to distinguish meritorious from nonmeritorious claims. In other
words, the goal of enhancing predictability deserves a higher priority
than the discouragement of meritless claims.
B. The Point of Procedure
The preceding discussion assumes that rapid evolution is a desira-
ble characteristic of law, a point that remains to be justified. It is be-
yond the scope of this Article to provide a detailed justification. A
few comments are all I can provide here.
The assumption underlying this project is that law establishes a
set of rules that makes an implicit contract among actors. It should be
clear that it is easier for actors to comply with the rules when they are
the same or at least close to the rules they would have adopted them-
selves in a setting of low transaction costs. Take, for example, the
negligence rule. It is a simple solution to the problem of controlling
accident costs. It is unlikely that parties in a zero transaction cost set-
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ting would choose strict liability because, in addition to enormous ad-
ministrative problems, 80 it would fail to adequately regulate incentives
to take care.81 Thus, the negligence rule suggests itself as a solution
parties probably would choose in a low transaction cost setting.
Since law must operate largely without the help of officials or
judges, it is desirable that it correspond closely with terms the contract
parties would choose themselves. Law that diverges significantly from
this norm takes the form of a set of rules that would seem inappropri-
ate to the parties. Put another way, law that is dislodged and uncon-
nected to the expectations and norms generated in ordinary
intercourse would be a constant source of surprise, like Caligula's
edicts.82
It follows that dynamic predictability is the most important crite-
rion. Procedural rules that foster dynamic predictability have the ef-
fect of tying law closely to expectations. These expectations change
with underlying conditions and with the introduction of new technol-
ogy. Procedural rules that enhance dynamic predictability enable the
law to respond to shifts in expectations.
Thus, the underlying normative theory of procedure may be
stated as follows: procedural rules make up the cords connecting law
to the set of expectations and norms generated in social interaction
and the cost-allocation rules form an important part of these cords.
Rules such as the American and British rules put a substantial barrier
in front of claims that are well grounded in expectations, but not in
established law. The result is that the law drifts further from the un-
derlying set of expectations-in the direction of Caligula's edicts. The
Pro-plaintiff rule minimizes the barrier between claims that are well
grounded in expectations, but not so in law. By enabling the largest
percentage of such claims, the rule maximizes the likelihood that law
will modify itself in light of underlying expectations.
As I have suggested, this goal may require the sacrifice of some
degree of static predictability. The desirableness of static predictabil-
ity, however, has been exaggerated. A statute whose scope of applica-
tion is entirely clear is of little use if it is likely to be rendered obsolete
80. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 90-95 (discussing causation and strict liability).
81. See John P. Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323,
338-41, 347 (1973); see also Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
7 (1980).
82. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 46 ("[lIt is incumbent on the promulgators to [state the
law] in the most public and perspicuous manner; not like Caligula, who.., wrote his laws in a
very small character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the
people.").
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by a change in conditions. Equivalently, clarity is not useful if it also
limits a rule's scope of application to a set of measure zero. The most
important predictability characteristic is one that would allow ordi-
nary people to identify the rules that apply to their transactions.
The evolution of antitrust law may be taken as a case in favor of
the Pro-plaintiff rule. I contend that the most important characteristic
of a statute such as the Sherman Act is the ease with which firms can
determine whether they are in compliance. This is enhanced by bring-
ing the law in line with norms of conduct that operate in the market.
The federal common law connected with the Sherman Act has essen-
tially moved in this direction over time. The Supreme Court's first
effort to interpret Section 1 of the Sherman Act, United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n.,83 resulted in the literal reading that the
statute outlawed all combinations in restraint of trade.84 This reading
was in large part superseded by the Court's adoption of the Rule of
Reason in 1911.85 Under the Rule of Reason, only those combina-
tions that unreasonably restrained trade would be found in violation
of the Act. It is probably fair to say that the evolution of antitrust law
reveals a steady movement toward the adoption of rule of reason tests
in all areas of litigation.
The increasing reliance on reasonableness tests in antitrust law is
a movement away from rigid, formal legal tests, based largely on the
words of the statute, toward flexible rules that incorporate the expec-
tations of actors. The formal tests are embodied in the per se rules,
which hold certain practices unlawful irrespective of reasonableness
justifications. Although Congress has attempted several times to com-
pel courts to apply per se rules to antitrust violations, the most famous
attempt culminating in the Clayton Act of 1914,86 the trend over time
in court decisions has been to move away from such rules. For exam-
ple, the law governing tying arrangements, specifically prohibited by
83. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
84. Id. at 328.
85. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
86. The efforts of that period, a response to the Court's decision in Standard Oil, led to the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994), and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-
58 (1994), both enacted in 1914. The Clayton Act set out bright-line rules outlawing certain
practices where they tended to result in monopoly power. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-14 (1994). The Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act did not aim to establish bright-line rules; instead, it set up an agency
armed with the statutory authority to investigate and prosecute "unfair methods of competi-
tion." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). It was generally understood that the FTC could investigate and
prosecute cases where the defendant's conduct fell short of the evidentiary requirements of a
Sherman Act violation.
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Section 3 of the Clayton Act, has moved generally in the direction of a
rule of reason standard.87
While it seems to be the general consensus that this trend is the
result of changes in the preferences of judges, this theory is unpersua-
sive. It is hard to believe that the set of judges interpreting the Sher-
man Act could have become an increasingly anti-interventionist body
over the last one hundred years. The trial selection process is a more
plausible explanation, and a crucial part of that selection process is the
Pro-plaintiff rule. By placing a minimal burden on plaintiffs whose
claims, though weak in terms of established law, are justifiable on eco-
nomic reasonableness grounds, the Pro-plaintiff rule enables courts to
develop a case law that gives careful consideration to the reasonable-
ness arguments of the parties. This case law, in turn, permits courts to
make distinctions between claims that are grounded in the form, but
not in the substance of antitrust law.
V. CONCLUSION
Most analyses of legal uncertainty are concerned with certainty in
the static sense, i.e., in determining the scope of a rule's application at
a given moment. Another source of uncertainty, dynamic, however,
arises from the possibility that the law may change over time or fail to
be consistent with expectations. Procedural systems and rules within
procedural systems may be ranked in terms of their influence on these
types of uncertainty.
This Article ranks the American ("no-way" fee shifting), British
("two-way"), and Pro-plaintiff ("one-way") litigation cost-allocation
rules in terms of their influence on uncertainty or, equivalently, pre-
dictability of law. I conclude that the British and American rules are
relatively similar in their influences on static uncertainty, with perhaps
a slight advantage for the British rule. The American rule, however, is
superior as a device for minimizing dynamic uncertainty. The best
rule overall on predictability grounds is the Pro-plaintiff rule.
87. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 5 (1984); United States
Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters. 429 U.S. 610, 611 (1977). In her concurring opinion in Jefferson
Parish, Justice O'Connor calls for an open shift to the rule of reason standard in tying arrange-
ments. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 34-35. In addition, many courts have been reluctant to give
the FTC an entirely free hand in interpreting the Federal Trade Commission Act. See E.J. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (absent
"some indicia of oppressiveness," independent adoption of delivered pricing system and most
favored nations clauses is not an unfair method of competition).
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